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the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on November 1, 2007, and of the address
delivered as the 2007 Bar Law Reform Committee Lecture delivered in the Inner
Temple Hall on November 14, 2007.
The establishment of the Law Commission ofEngland and Wales in 1965 marked a fundamentalchange in our constitutional arrangements. It
ushered in the modern era of independent law reform.
The past 10 years have been a period of remarkable
constitutional change. They come on top of a lengthy
period in which the office of the Lord Chancellor and his
Department have been transformed almost beyond
recognition. Now the government has issued its green
paper on the Governance of Britain, inviting a national
debate about, among other things, a British Bill of Rights
and Duties. There could not be a more opportune time to
assess the historic success or otherwise of independent law
reform in England and Wales and to anticipate its future.
BEFORE THE CREATION OF THE
COMMISSION
In order to understand the quantum leap represented by
the establishment of the Commission in 1965, it is
necessary to place that event in its historical context.
It was the codification of the French civil law under
Napoleon which provided the moral and intellectual
impetus for systematic law reform in Britain. The codifiers
conceived the idea of simplifying and re-stating the vast
body of earlier law, so as to make the law more
understandable and accessible to ordinary people. That
inspired Jeremy Bentham and JS Mill in England, and their
writings, in turn, promoted Parliamentary revision of
English law. It led to the great era of codification and
statute law revision (ie the repeal of obsolete or redundant
statutes) in the 19th century.
That process began in earnest in 1868 when Lord
Chancellor Cairns appointed the Statute Law Committee
with the remit of producing a revised edition of the statutes
and of supervising progress on statute law revision and
consolidation. There were 29 statute law revision Acts
passed over the next 40 years or so, based mostly on
recommendations of that Committee.
In 1934 Lord Sankey created the Law Revision
Committee. This was the first standing law reform
committee, that is to say concerned with reform of the law
generally rather than merely the repeal and consolidation
of existing statutes. It was a Ministerial committee, to
which he appointed judges, barristers, solicitors and legal
academics. It ceased to function in 1939.
In 1952 the English Law Reform Committee was
established by Lord Chancellor Simonds to replace the
earlier Law Revision Committee. That was where matters
stood prior to the establishment of the Law Commission in
1965. The pattern up to this point is of a series of
Ministerial committees, whose members were part time,
and which were not in any way permanent or entrenched
bodies.
THE MOVEMENT FOR PERMANENT,
INDEPENDENT LAW REFORM
In 1963 the Society of Labour Lawyers sponsored the
publication of a book Law Reform –Now, edited by Gerald
Gardiner QC and Dr Andrew Martin. Gerald Gardiner, in
particular, had by then become a strong critic of the many
respects in which English law was unclear, inaccessible,
outdated and unjust, and of the absence of a permanent
body or mechanism equal to the task of remedying those
defects.
The first chapter of the book, entitled “The Machinery
of Reform”, was written by Gerald Gardiner and Dr
Martin. In that chapter they said that the problem of
bringing the law up to date and keeping it up to date was 3
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largely one of machinery, and that the then existing
machinery was not geared to steady, planned and co-
ordinated operation. They said that nothing less would do
than the setting up within the Lord Chancellor’s Office of
a strong unit concerned exclusively with law reform,
including codification. They recommended that the head
of the proposed unit should carry the rank of a Minister of
State (who they called the Vice-Chancellor), who would be
concerned exclusively with law reform and who would sit
in the House of Commons.
They said that the Vice-Chancellor should preside over a
committee of Law Commissioners, whose office and status
would be established by statute. They would be full-time,
and would not be ordinary civil servants, but would enjoy
a high degree of independence. Their chief responsibility
would be to review, bring up to date and keep up to date
the general law, and they would do so by a plan for its
systematic review. They should have an appropriate staff of
legal assistants, at least some of whom would be trained in
comparative research, as well as Parliamentary draftsmen.
The authors proposed that there should be a rule that no
Parliamentary year should pass without the enactment of at
least one Law Reform Act.
THE CREATION OF THE COMMISSION
Gerald Gardiner was very shortly afterwards in a
position to transform into reality that vision of a
permanent body devoted to bringing and keeping the law
up to date. In 1964 he became Lord Chancellor in the first
administration of Harold Wilson.
In 1965 that administration issued a white paper on the
creation of a Law Commission for England and Wales and
a Law Commission for Scotland. The same bold vision was
set out. The white paper said:
“One of the hallmarks of an advanced society is that its laws
should not only be just but also that they should be kept up-
to-date and be readily accessible to all who are affected by
them. The state of the law today cannot be said to satisfy
these requirements.
….
it is today extremely difficult for anyone without special
training to discover what the law is on any given topic: and
when the law is finally ascertained, it is found in many cases
to be obsolete and in some cases to be unjust. This is plainly
wrong. English law should be capable of being recast in a
form which is accessible, intelligible and in accordance with
modern needs
…
There is at present no body charged with the duty of keeping
the law as a whole under review and making
recommendations for its systematic reform… it is evident that
comprehensive reform can be achieved only by a body whose
sole task it is and which is equipped with a professional staff
on the scale required.”
I turn to the scheme of the Law Commissions Act 1965
which, following the white paper, created the Law
Commission of England and Wales. Section 1 of the 1965
Act provides for the appointment by the Lord Chancellor
of five Law Commissioners, of whom one is appointed
chairman. The Commissioners must be the holder of a
judicial office, or be a barrister or solicitor or university law
teacher. The Act provides for Commissioners to be
appointed for a term not exceeding five years. The
appointments are full time.
Until 2007, there was nothing in the 1965 Act which
required the chairman to be a judge rather than one of the
other categories of person qualified to serve as a
Commissioner. Traditionally, however, the Chairman has
been a serving High Court judge who has been appointed
for three years. The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement
Act 2007 now provides that the chairman must be a judge
of the High Court or of the Court of Appeal. Section 3 of
the 1965 Act sets out the primary duty of the Law
Commission
“to take and keep under review all the law [of England and
Wales]… with a view to its systematic development and
reform, including in particular the codification of such law,
the elimination of anomalies, the repeal of obsolete and
unnecessary enactments, the reduction of the number of
separate enactments and generally simplification and
modernisation of the law…”
Section 3 of the 1965 Act then sets out the various
different ways in which that objective may be achieved. It
provides, among other things, for the preparation and
submission from time to time to the Lord Chancellor of
programmes of reform, as well as the undertaking of
particular projects of reform at the request of government
Departments, and the preparation of draft Bills to
accompany the Commission’s proposals for reform.
The Act provides for the programmes of reform
proposed by the Commission to be approved by the Lord
Chancellor, and that he shall lay them and the
Commission’s reform recommendations before
Parliament. It also provides for an annual report by the
Commission to be submitted to the Lord Chancellor and
to be laid before Parliament.
The independence of the Commission is reflected in its
status as a Non Departmental Public Body, and the fact
that, while the Lord Chancellor has the legal power to
decline to approve a programme of reform proposed by
the Commission, neither the Lord Chancellor not anyone
else has the power to compel the Commission to take on
any particular project. The custom, and now the legal
requirement, that the chairman must be a senior judge is
also a powerful symbolic reflection of its independence.4
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THE WORK AND SUCCESS OF THE
COMMISSION
It is probably true to say that, outside of Parliament itself
and the Departments of State, no body has had greater
impact on the law and the lives of our citizens than the Law
Commission since 1965. It has published 176 final reports
on law reform, 43 reports on consolidation, and 17 reports
on the repeal of obsolete statutes.
The Commission’s reports on statute law revision have
led to the repeal of more than 2000 Acts in their entirety
and the partial repeal of several thousand other Acts. The
repeal of obsolete statutes ought to be, of its nature,
uncontentious. In the field of law reform, however,
especially on the international stage, there is always the
potential for the unexpected. In July 2006, for example,
the Law Commission published its report on the repeal of
expired statutes from the 17th to 19th centuries relating to
turnpikes in Essex, Sussex and Norfolk. This prompted the
following observations on a United States website under
the heading “History at Risk – Turnpikes Under Attack
from British Law reformers”:
“Britain’s great turnpike heritage is at risk. A panel of legal
fussies called the Law Commission are trying to purge
hundreds of harmless old turnpike laws from the British
statutes – news that confirms once again the wisdom of the
US Declaration of Independence and of General George
Washington’s small war in the 1770’s to rid us of these
misguided overlords…The first question for this Honourable
Mr Justice Sir Terence Etherton (let’s just call him Terence,
eh?) at the next press conference of the Law Commission
surely is: ‘What do you propose The Hon Mr Justice Sir
Terence if you delegislate turnpikes to have in place of the
Jersey Turnpike as the opening scene for the Sopranos?…’”
It is in the field of law reform, however, that the Law
Commission has played its most influential role in society.
Over two thirds of its law reform reports have been
implemented in whole or in part. A further 5 per cent have
been accepted by government, but have not yet been
implemented. A further 10 per cent are awaiting
government response. Accordingly, almost three quarters
of Law Commission law reform reports have been
accepted in whole or in part by successive governments.
The areas of law and activity covered by those reports
which have been accepted and implemented by
government, or have been accepted in principle and await
implementation, are highly diverse.
About 90 Acts of Parliament enacted since 1965 have
contained Law Commission recommendations. The
Defective Premises Act 1972, the Matrimonial Causes Act
1973, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and
Dependants) Act 1975, the Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, the Sale
and Supply of Goods Act 1994, the Family Law Act 1996,
the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provision) Act 1989
and the Land Registration Act 2002 are just a few examples
in the area of civil law.
The Commission has also enjoyed particular success in
the field of criminal law. Recent statutes incorporating Law
Commission recommendations include the Criminal
Justice Act 2003, the Domestic Violence, Crimes and
Victims Act 2004, the Fraud Act 2006, and, with its
enactment on 30 October this year, the Serious Crime Act
2007 (which gives effect to our proposals for new offences
of assisting and encouraging crime). In the range of its
work, the high standard of its reports, and its national and
international standing, the Law Commission stands pre-
eminent among the 60 or more law reform bodies in the
world.
HISTORICAL PATTERN OF SUCCESS
Why then is there a view of many lawyers that the
Commission, like Dr Johnson’s view of second marriage, is
a triumph of hope over experience? There is no doubt that
the most successful period in the history of the Law
Commission was in its first five years. During that time the
Law Commission published 24 law reform reports, 22 of
which were accepted and implemented in their entirety
and the remaining two in part. Although that record has
never subsequently been matched, the entire period to
1990 is impressive.
Taking successive five year periods between 1965 and
1990, the statistics show that government accepted in
whole or in part not less than 70 per cent of the law reform
reports of the Law Commission published during those
periods, and all those reports which were accepted have
been implemented. The period to 1990 may be graphically
contrasted with the period since then. In the five years
1996-2000, the Law Commission published 17 reports, of
which 47 per cent have been accepted and implemented,
12 per cent have been accepted but still await
implementation, and no less than 35 per cent still await
government response. In the following five years 2001-
2005 the Commission published 20 reports, of which 35
per cent have been accepted and implemented, a further
25 per cent have been accepted but still await
implementation, and a further 20 per cent still await
government response.
This means that, in relation to the Commission’s law
reform reports published during the period 1996-2000,
no less than 47 per cent have never been rejected by the
government, but still await implementation or, at any
event, some government decision and action. For the
period 2001-2005, the comparable statistic is 45 per cent
of Law Commission law reform reports. In most cases
where the government has simply failed to respond to
reports during those years, the lack of response falls well
outside the two and a half year period (since publication)
within which Departments are required, according to the
terms of the protocol which I will describe later, to give a 5
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definitive decision specifying whether they accept or reject
the Commission’s recommendations.
ANALYSIS OF PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
PROBLEMS
Looking back on the last 42 years of the Commission, I
believe it is possible to identify the causes of the difficulties
which the Commission has increasingly encountered in its
relations with government. The analysis does not involve
blame, but rather identifies political, legislative and
governmental changes that have had a profound effect on
the relations between the executive and the Law
Commission, as they have had on other bodies.
It is significant that the period 1966-1970, which was
the most successful period in the history of the
Commission, coincided with the Lord Chancellorship of
Lord Gardiner. As we have seen, he had a passionate and
principled interest in the reform of the law to make it
more modern, accessible and just, and he was responsible
for the establishment of the Commission to carry forward
his vision.
Critically, he was Lord Chancellor at a time when his
Department (then called the Lord Chancellor’s Office) was
extremely small with few politically sensitive functions. At
the same time, he combined the roles of Head of the
Judiciary, the Speakership of the House of Lords, and
membership of the executive with a senior Cabinet
position. The Lord Chancellor was a highly influential
member of the government, not by virtue of the size of his
Department or the range of its functions and their political
sensitivity, but by virtue of the constitutional significance of
his office independent of party politics. The combination
of those special characteristics within the Lord Chancellor,
when added to a principled interest in law reform, ensured
enactment of good Law Commission proposals within a
reasonable time frame.
The political landscape has changed dramatically over
time. Today, the reality is that the Lord Chancellorship is a
facet of being the Secretary of State for Justice. As such,
the Lord Chancellor is a fully fledged party politician,
shorn of any independent judicial or legislative role. True it
is that, under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and by
virtue of his oath, the Lord Chancellor is bound to respect
the rule of law, defend the independence of the judiciary
and ensure the provision of resources for the efficient and
effective support of the courts. Nevertheless, the political
reality is that, unlike the Lord Chancellors of former times,
he is wholly within the Cabinet and in no real sense or
respect detached from it. His influence is measured by the
relative size and importance of his Department and his
personal political standing. He does not therefore have the
constitutional attributes of former Lord Chancellors,
whose high standing and influence reflected the unique
constitutional position and facets of the Lord Chancellor’s
Office.
At the same time, he heads a Department which, in its
size, the range of its responsibilities, and their political
sensitivity, bears no comparison with the former Lord
Chancellor’s office. While the formal change in the
constitutional role of the Lord Chancellor, in particular the
termination of his role as Head of the Judiciary and the
Speakership of the House of Lords, date only from the
constitutional reforms of 2005, that dramatic change can
be seen as part of a process of politicisation which can be
traced back to 1971 and gathered increasing pace in the
1980s.
The Lord Chancellor took over the running of the Court
service under the Courts Act 1971. More importantly, he
took over responsibility for criminal legal aid in 1980 and
civil legal aid in 1988. Responsibility for those matters,
with all their implications for civil and legal justice and for
significant slices of the national budget, inevitably brought
a new party political edge to his position. More recently, as
part of the same trend, his Department has taken on
responsibility for the Magistrates Courts, for criminal law
policy and for the prison service.
Those changes are reflected in the departmental budget.
The DCA departmental report to Parliament for 2006-7
estimated the total amount to be spent during that year on
the justice system in England and Wales at £3.49 billion of
which just over £4 million (ie 0.1%) was attributable to the
Law Commission. Those changes have historically had an
obvious harming effect on the sponsorship role of the DCA
and now the MoJ for the Commission.
The vision in “Law reform – Now” of a strong unit in the
Lord Chancellor’s office headed by a Minister of State
concerned exclusively with law reform has been translated
in practice today into a very small sponsorship team
located in the HM Court Service section of the
Department. That insouciant administrative pigeon-
holding of the Commission within a court delivery service
reflects both an awkward confusion or embarrassment as
to how to deal with the Commission and, more
particularly, a reflection of its low priority within a
Department dealing with a wide range of highly politically
charged and resource intensive functions.
Alongside these historical developments, and bound up
with them, is the remarkable increase in legislation giving
effect to party manifesto obligations, and general political
policy initiatives, including matters of the moment. The
number of pages of legislation nearly trebled in the 40
years 1965-2005 from 7567 pages in 1965 to
approximately 20,800 pages in 2005. In addition to this
increase the size of each page of legislation has also
increased by 11 per cent. Since 1997 there have been 455
Public General Acts and more than 37,000 statutory
instruments.
The marked increase in legislative activity across
government has inevitably restricted the Parliamentary
time available for enactment of non-political, non-party6
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Law Commission reports. With Ministers and
Departments competing vigorously for a share of the
limited Parliamentary time available each session, priority
is understandably claimed for those initiatives which will
best secure votes and the political support of the electorate.
That tension between the Commission’s law reform
proposals and other more politically charged policy
initiatives has had and continues to have its impact not
merely at Cabinet level, in the legislative programme
committee, but within each Department, including the
DCA and now the MoJ. Resources are concentrated within
Departments, including the MoJ, on those matters which
are judged to be of greatest political value or present the
greatest political risk.
Another feature of modern political life is the increased
movement of Ministers, particularly junior Ministers,
between and within Departments. For example, within the
last 15 months since I was appointed chairman of the
Commission, there have been no fewer than four junior
Ministers in the DCA/MoJ with responsibility for the Law
Commission, that is to say averaging less than four months
each.
By contrast, experience has shown that it would be
extremely difficult for the usual Law Commission project
to be completed, with a draft Bill, in under three years.
This disparity between the life of a project and the
movement of junior Ministers within Departments means
that there can be no assumption that a project supported,
and even promoted, by a Department will be regarded with
the same enthusiasm, or indeed any enthusiasm, at its
conclusion.
PAST SOLUTIONS
Successive Lord Chancellors have not been
unsympathetic to the difficulties faced by the Law
Commission in securing implementation of its reports.
With varying degrees of enthusiasm and success, they have
sought to find ways to alleviate at least some of the
problems.
So far as concerns the Law Commission’s work on
consolidation and the repeal of obsolete statutes, an
appropriate Parliamentary procedure was early and easily
found by bringing the Commission’s recommendations
within the ambit of the existing Joint Parliamentary
Committee on Consolidation Bills and the expedited
Parliamentary procedure applicable to them. This accounts
for the 100 per cent success rate of the Law Commission’s
proposals in those areas.
A number of initiatives have been tried to facilitate and
expedite the passage through Parliament of the
Commission’s law reform proposals. None have proved
successful in the long term. In particular, attempts have
been made from time to time to shorten the time taken on
the floor of each House by Law Commission-inspired Bills
by moving part of the process off the floor and into
committee. None of those initiatives has enjoyed enduring
success because in every case the use of them has depended
on the personalities, knowledge and inclinations of the
government’s business managers from time to time.
More recently, the government tried to introduce a
special legislative procedure for Law Commission
recommendations in the Legislative and Regulatory
Reform Bill introduced in the House of Commons in
January 2006. This was an important and welcome
recognition of the inadequacy of Parliamentary procedures
for the implementation of Law Commission proposals. By
the time the Bill had passed through the Commons and
was introduced in the Lords, clause 3 provided for a
Minister to be able to implement by order
recommendations of the Law Commission. The
government abandoned that clause, however, at committee
stage in the Lords following complaints that the House
should have the ability to scrutinise the Law Commission
proposals, and that under the clause 3 procedure there
would be no facility for Parliament to make amendments.
Another important initiative was the setting up by Lord
Irvine in 2000 of the Ministerial Committee for the Law
Commission to promote the Law Commission as a
resource within government. It now also has the formal
role of advising the Lord Chancellor on acceptance of the
Law Commission’s proposals for its three yearly
programmes of reform.
The Ministerial Committee is chaired by the junior
Minister in the MoJ with responsibility for the Law
Commission, and its members comprise the junior
Ministers in the Departments with which the Commission
has the closest contact. It has not been a success. It has
proved difficult to secure the attendance of its members,
and in the past they have sometimes sent officials in their
place. It did not meet at all for a period of some 18 months
prior to an attempt in July 2006 to revive it by the then
Minister for the Law Commission and my predecessor,
Roger Toulson. A meeting called earlier this year was
inquorate, when only three Ministers attended.
Finally, in March 2003 John Halliday CB published a
report on the Law Commission as part of the usual
quinquennial cycle of review of NDPBs. Following his
recommendations, a protocol was drawn up setting out the
way in which the Law Commission and government should
work together to achieve the objectives in the 1965 white
paper and the 1965 Act. The protocol, which was last
updated in 2006, is entitled “The Law Commission and
Government – working together to deliver the benefits of
clear, simple and modern law”. It is a detailed, and
thoroughly worthy and appropriate document. More often
than not, however, civil servants within Departments are
unaware of, or at any event proceed with disregard for, its
contents; not least the requirements that Departments
should aim to respond to reports within six months of 7
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publication, and must in any event give a definitive decision
on whether they intend to implement the report within
two and a half years of its publication.
SOLUTIONS
This litany of woes, groans and moans does not leave me
dismayed. Far from it. The Law Commission remains an
extraordinarily vibrant and highly productive reform
agency, producing work of the highest quality. We are
regularly consulted by, and advise, representatives of both
established and emerging democracies about independent
law reform. Within the UK, the Commission is admired
and respected throughout government and Parliament,
and, I believe, the legal profession and the judiciary.
Admiration, of course, particularly if based upon a
distant record of success, is not enough. It is right that the
Commission should ask itself, and continually re-assess,
whether, and to what extent, it is successful, or indeed that
it is providing value for money. This raises issues about the
definition of success for an independent law reform agency
such as ours. Legislative implementation of reports is, of
course, a very important measure of success. It is not,
however, the only measure, bearing in mind, among other
things, that we are an advisory body and not an
implementation agency. It is for the democratically elected
government to decide precisely when reports should be
enacted, and in some cases this happens a decade or more
after the reports are published. It must be right, therefore,
that at least one other appropriate criterion of success is
the extent to which our reports are accepted by
government, even if not implemented immediately.
In my view, other legitimate criteria of success are the
contribution of our reports to academic discussion and
research, and to the clarification and development of the
law by the courts. I would also add that their contribution
to debate within and outside the legislature, and in that way
laying the ground for future developments, is important.
This is not the time to consider further this important
topic, and the need generally to promote a more
sophisticated set of performance indicators than
implementation.
Even limiting the criteria of success to acceptance by
government and implementation, the Commission is not
currently unsuccessful, as I have pointed out earlier. What
we have to face, however, is the clear evidence that the
effectiveness of the Commission within government has
been steadily undermined by all the historical
developments and changes since 1965 which I have
mentioned earlier. Those trends will only intensify, not
diminish. There is therefore an urgent need to seek
solutions to the political, and what may be described as
structural, problems facing the Commission in relation to
timely consideration, acceptance and implementation of
our reports by government.
Notwithstanding the difficulties and failures of past
initiatives, I believe that practicable and realistic solutions
can be identified, and the present government’s
encouragement of a national debate about civic rights,
duties and citizenship provides a unique opportunity for
the implementation of those solutions. It is also very good
news that the present Lord Chancellor, Jack Straw, and the
Minister of State for the Law Commission, Michael Wills
MP, are both closely involved in the government’s
constitutional agenda and have expressed a strong interest
in supporting and promoting the effectiveness of the
Commission.
The starting point is to concentrate on, and to
emphasise, the constitutional importance of the work of
the Commission, rather than on the Commission as an
institution. It is the constitutional right of the citizen to be
subject to laws which are, in the words of the 1965 white
paper, “accessible, intelligible and in accordance with
modern needs”. That was the principle which inspired the
French codifiers over 200 years ago, Jeremy Bentham and
JS Mills in England in the 19th century, and Gerald
Gardiner and the other proponents of the establishment of
a permanent, independent Law Commission in the last
century. The Law Commission was established, and its
governing legislation is specifically worded, to promote
that principle.
In delivering the Sixth Sir David Williams Lecture on
“the rule of law” in November 2006 in Cambridge, Lord
Bingham said that the first sub-rule of the rule of law is
that the law must be accessible and so far as possible
intelligible, clear and predictable. Section 1 of the
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 provides that nothing in
the Act adversely affects the existing constitutional
principle of the rule of law. Section 17 sets out the oath to
be taken by the Lord Chancellor on acceptance of office. In
it he swears to respect the rule of law.
If the government fails in a timely manner to consider,
and, where appropriate, accept and then implement Law
Commission’s recommendations, what matters is not
whether the Commission has been slighted, but that the
citizen has been denied the constitutional right to law
which is accessible, intelligible and in accordance with
modern needs.
It therefore seems to me entirely appropriate and
desirable that this constitutional right of the citizen, and
the concomitant duty of the Ministers of the Crown to
secure it, should be clearly stated in the government’s
proposed Constitutional Renewal Bill or other legislation
arising out of the Governance of Britain green paper. We
have so proposed to the Lord Chancellor, and that proposal
is currently under consideration.
Next, as I have said, there is within government both
ignorance of, and knowing disregard of, the protocol which
sets out in detail the way government should promote the
objectives in the 1965 white paper and the 1965 Act by co-8
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operating with the Commission and dealing with the
Commission’s reports in a timely and appropriate manner.
The solution here is that there should be a statutory
obligation on the Lord Chancellor to lay before Parliament
a scheme embracing the principal features of the protocol.
Further, there should be a statutory obligation on the
Lord Chancellor to lay before Parliament each year a report
stating, in relation to each unimplemented proposal of Law
Commission reports, whether it is proposed to implement
it, and, if not, why not, and if it is to be implemented,
when it is expected that will happen.
These last two sets of statutory provisions dealing with
machinery are in practical support of the constitutional
right of the citizen to law which is intelligible, accessible
and in accordance with modern needs. They too should
find a natural place in the constitutional reform legislation
arising out of the Governance of Britain green paper. We
have so proposed to the Lord Chancellor, and that proposal
is also currently under consideration.
Although this legislation we have proposed would merely
give statutory effect to what is, or is supposed to be,
current principle and practice, the significance of the
legislation would be profound. The fundamental right of
the citizen to accessible, intelligible and modern law
would, for the first time, be articulated in statute, the
practical means of its promotion would become statutory,
and Parliament would be its overseer.
Irrespective of any such proposed new legislation, the
political changes I have outlined earlier, and their adverse
impact on the response of government to Law Commission
reports, make a strong case for greater Parliamentary
scrutiny. The Commission needs to build a closer
relationship with relevant Parliamentary select committees,
including, in particular, the Justice Committee in the
Commons and the Constitution Committee in the Lords,
which can enquire into the government’s acceptance and
promotion of the work of the Commission, and hold the
Executive to account.
Our efforts to achieve this have recently borne fruit. On
October 24, 2007 the Chairman of the Constitution
Committee wrote to Baroness Ashton, the leader in the
Lords, asking for the government’s plans for each
outstanding Law Commission report and the reasons for
the delay in responding to or implementing them. The
letter also stated that it is the intention of the Committee
to take evidence from the chairman of the Law
Commission after publication of the Commission’s next
annual report. This is an important development in the
relationship between Parliament, the Executive and the
Commission.
There remains the difficult and enduring problem of
securing time for Law Commission proposals in the
government’s crowded legislative programme. There is a
modest glimmer of hope here. Following the abandonment
by the government of clause 3 of the Legislative and
Regulatory Reform Bill, Baroness Ashton and my
predecessor, Roger Toulson, began to explore the
possibility of an expedited procedure in the House of
Lords for appropriate Law Commission Bills. Under that
procedure a committee would be able, off the floor of the
House, to consider technical or uncontentious Law
Commission Bills, take evidence and make amendments.
Such Bills would then complete all their remaining
legislative stages in both the Lords and the Commons very
rapidly. The initiative has faced hurdles, delays and
difficulties, but it appears to command the support of the
main opposition parties and of the Lord Chancellor.
Baroness Ashton hopes to be in a position to conduct a
pilot in the near future.
That procedure should assist considerably with several of
the Commission’s reports on more technical and less
policy laden areas of the law, which have been accepted in
principle by government but have not yet found a place in
the legislative programme. What then to do about other
reports of the Commission, which are acceptable in
principle to the government but would not be appropriate
for the new joint committee expedited procedure?
We have proposed that the government should adopt a
protocol that, in addition to Bills processed through the
joint committee expedited procedure, there should be at
least one Law Commission Bill, which has been accepted in
principle by the government, per session. As I mentioned
earlier, that was the proposal of Gerald Gardiner and Dr
Martin in 1963. That proposal is currently under
consideration by the government.
Further, the Ministerial Committee should be chaired by
the Lord Chancellor, rather than a junior Minister, and its
members should be the political heads of Departments
rather than junior Ministers. This would involve a much
closer association of members of the Cabinet with the work
of the Commission in general, and their personal
endorsement of the Commission’s programmes of reform
in particular. This should increase substantially the
prospect of continued political support at the highest level
for the projects of the Law Commission from beginning to
end. In the light of my discussions with Ministers, I regard
this proposal as achievable.
Finally, there is a strong case for correcting what may be
regarded as a structural defect in the existing statutory
framework for the Law Commission. The work of the
Commission crosses all departmental boundaries, as the
list of our completed projects plainly shows. Yet approval of
the programmes of reform lies with the Lord Chancellor
who, as Secretary of State for Justice, is head of the MoJ.
History has shown only too clearly that the MoJ, in its
previous incarnations, has increasingly failed effectively to
promote the role of the Commission and to ensure
compliance with the protocol in other Departments. In
fact, the MoJ, in its previous incarnations, has had the 9
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worst record of all Departments in complying with the
protocol. This is not due to any personal inadequacy of
successive Lord Chancellors. These are merely the
consequences of the same historical problems and trends
identified earlier.
The statutory oath of the Lord Chancellor to uphold the
rule of law, and the central role of the present Lord
Chancellor in the programme of constitutional renewal, his
political experience and seniority within the Cabinet, and
his genuine commitment to the work of the Law
Commission, make him a very desirable statutory sponsor
of the Law Commission at the present time. On the other
hand, and having an eye both to past history and a future
time beyond the present incumbent, it seems logical and
more appropriate that the specific function of approving
the Law Commission’s programmes of reform should be
that of the Prime Minister, as the head of government.
There is no reason in principle why the Commission’s
programmes of reform must be approved by a lawyer, any
more than the approval of the legislative programme for
the government should be reserved to lawyers. Indeed,
although the present Lord Chancellor is a barrister by
training, under section 2 of the Constitutional Reform Act
2005 a future Lord Chancellor need not be a lawyer.
Further, the Prime Minister is pre-eminently the person
who must uphold, and should be seen to be upholding, the
rule of law.
Under this proposal, the Ministerial Committee for the
Law Commission would become a committee of the
Cabinet, chaired by the Lord Chancellor, which would
advise the Prime Minister on approval of the Commission’s
programme of reform. Although, under this proposal, the
Lord Chancellor would remain the statutory sponsor of the
Commission, the change would send the clearest message
throughout the executive as to the importance of the work
of the Commission, and would tie in the Prime Minister
and the entire Cabinet to the approved programmes of
reform.
This package of reforms would have a significant long
term impact on the effectiveness of the Commission and, I
predict, on the scope and nature of its work.
THE WORK AND WORK PRACTICES OF THE
COMMISSION
In the very early days of the Commission its
programmes of reform were dominated by the grand vision
of codification of the entire law by statute. Its first
programme of reform, for example, published in 1965,
included codification of the law of contract and of the law
of landlord and tenant. The second programme included
codification of criminal law and family law. It soon became
clear, however, that these ambitious projects of codification
were too large, too consuming of time and resources, and
insufficiently connected to the social, political and
governmental concerns of the moment. They all petered
out or were abandoned.
Today, each proposed project is assessed by the
Commission against the three criteria of importance,
suitability and resources before acceptance. No project
would be considered suitable unless it had Departmental
support. Nor would it satisfy the suitability or resource
criteria if it would take too long to complete. In these
times of rapid political, legal, social and Ministerial
changes, any project that would take substantially longer
than three years to complete, with draft Bill attached, risks
losing government support by its completion.
Like the original grand design of codification, statutory
consolidation will remain one of our core tasks, but it is of
decreasing significance within our workload. This is partly
because consolidation cannot be undertaken unless the law
remains relatively settled while the consolidation is being
prepared, an increasingly rare state of affairs.
It is also partly because of changes made in the 1970s to
the way Parliament amends legislation. This is now
routinely done by textual amendment. With modern
electronic sources of legislation and existing reference
material, anyone wishing to see the latest version of an Act
can readily do so. The need to consolidate simply to take
account of textual change has largely gone.
Moving back to the area of our law reform work, there
are further important developments since the early years of
the Commission which are worth mentioning. First, our
projects now are vary rarely simply analyses of black letter
law. Empirical research both here and abroad is nearly
always a vital ingredient.
Second, and related to that, we recognise that the value
and political acceptability of our reports turn in large
measure on the practical impact they will have on society.
It is government policy that an impact assessment must be
conducted in relation to all new policies. Those
assessments are carried out within Departments. We
believe that the quality of our work, and the likelihood of
its acceptance, will be substantially improved if we carried
out our own impact assessments. We now, therefore,
employ a full time economist.
Finally, we recognise that we must work even harder to
engage the public in our work. In addition to the usual
forms of consultation, we have recently experimented with
a web forum, which enabled the public both to leave their
own comments on our web site and to see and comment
on the comments of others. This proved very successful.
CONCLUSION
What then is the answer to the question contained in the
title to this lecture?
The establishment of the Law Commission was indeed a
truly inspired vision, promoting in a radically new way the10
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right of citizens to laws which are intelligible, accessible
and which meet their needs. The Commission has achieved
a quite remarkable impact on large areas of our national life
in pursuit of that principle.
I am not in the slightest dismayed by the past or without
hope for the future. The dream is not at all shattered. Its
prospects are better than they have ever been, provided
that the government and Parliamentarians are prepared, at
this time of debate about citizenship, to take the steps
necessary to meet the challenges thrown up by the political
and governmental changes since 1965. I believe that they
will, and that the Law Commission of England and Wales
will continue to play a vital role in the constitutional life of
this country, and to be a beacon to other democracies
throughout the world.
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